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ed principles of justice and on the rule of law, for which men of earlier generations also gave up their lives.

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous November 4.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, under permission to revise and extend my remarks, I include the response I have received from the State Department on questions I asked on Vietnam in the House of Representatives on Wednesday, November 4.

Regrettably, the letter does not represent a satisfactory reply to my questions, but is largely an exercise in State Department gobbledygook. In all fairness it must be understood, however, that all the facts could not be made public at this time.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., November 26, 1963.
HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
House of Representatives.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI: I am writing you in response to the questions you raised regarding Vietnam on the floor of the House of Representatives on Wednesday, November 6.

I shall list in sequence each of the questions and then provide a response based on the Department's best knowledge and judgment of recent developments in Vietnam.

1. "Was the advisability of a coup against Diem and the U.S. role in such a development the subject of high level discussions subsequent to the August 20 raid of Buddhist pagodas?"

Coup reports have been endemic to the Vietnam situation for at least 3 years; their frequency increased in the period of tensions between the GVN and Buddhist leaders. The U.S. Government has regularly sought—even at the highest levels—to evaluate the credibility of such reports.

The coup d'etat of November 1, 1963, was a thoroughly Vietnamese affair. Although we were well aware of increasing Vietnamese dissatisfaction with repressive measures taken by the Diem regime and had received reports of various coup plottings, we had not reached a determination on the basis of available information as to whether any of these reports would prove to be correct.

2. "When the decision was made to curtail U.S. economic and military assistance to the Diem regime, was consideration given to the effect such action might have in encouraging the military to perpetrate a coup?"

Following the visit of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor to Vietnam, certain of our aid programs were put under review. The purpose of these actions was to carry out President Kennedy's declared policy of support for those things that furthered the war effort against the Communists and of opposition to those things that impeded the war effort; and to indicate to President Diem the increasingly urgent need to use our aid more effectively and to take measures to regain the dangerously waning support of his own people in order to pursue the war effort successfully. To be sure, our aid curtailment involved a calculated risk that our actions might encourage coup plotters. Given the circumstances, however, this was a risk that we were obliged to accept in the light of the greater risk that the war would be lost if we took no action.

3. "How can our policies toward the ruling

junta in South Vietnam be squared with our policies toward ruling juntas in the Dominican Republic and Honduras?"

There is little similarity between the situation we face in Vietnam, where an active war against communism is in progress, and that prevailing in Latin America, where our relationships are influenced by our commitments as a member of the Organization of American States.

The Revolutionary Council in South Vietnam displaced an increasingly authoritarian regime; it has committed itself to free elections, religious liberty, a free press, and constitutional government. The new Cabinet is essentially civilian in composition; it is made up of 11 civilians and 4 military personnel. In addition, the Revolutionary Council has established a "Council of Sages" which will act as an advisory group in the political field. Martial law has been lifted, the press has been given greater freedom, and the curfew restrictions have been ended. Immediately after the coup all Buddhist prisoners and most other non-Communist political prisoners were released.

On the other hand, the coup d'etat in the Dominican Republic involved the overthrow of President Juan Bosch who had been elected President by the Dominican people in December 1962. These elections were remarkably free of violence and fraud, according to OAS observers. As the constitutionally elected President, Bosch had the full support of the U.S. Government. He had been in office only 7 months when his administration was overthrown by a military coup on September 25, 1963. On October 4, Secretary of State Rusk stressed the importance of representative democracy in the attainment of the goals of the Alliance for Progress and as a requirement for normalization of relations between our two countries. As reported by the President in two recent news conferences, we have been in consultation with authorities in the Dominican Republic with a view toward their taking steps to bring about more representative government which would enable the United States to reconsider its position on nonrecognition. To date, these conversations have not yielded results that would make it possible to reconsider our position.

In the case of Honduras, the military deposed a civilian representative government which had been in office since December 1957, and under which there had been substantial progress, particularly since the initiation of the Alliance for Progress. The military action was taken to prevent the elections scheduled for October 13, 1963.

As you may know, in his statement of October 4, 1963, Secretary Rusk pointed out that the events in the Dominican Republic and Honduras had created a situation in which there is no opportunity for effective cooperation with the United States under the Alliance for Progress or for normalization of diplomatic relations.

We are now engaged in an extensive dialog with the principal elements in Honduras in order to develop a reasonable basis for restoring normal relations.

4. "Is it not the policy of the United States to extend asylum to save those whose lives are in danger? Why was Ngo Dinh Can surrendered to the military after the Diem-Nhu experience?"

When an individual is granted refuge in an American Embassy or consulate, he is not released until adequate assurances have been received regarding his personal safety. In the case of Ngo Dinh Can, Vietnamese authorities gave assurances to Ambassador Lodge guaranteeing Can's physical safety and promising to deal with him "legally and juridically." On the basis of these assurances Can willingly departed from the American consulate in Hue and was flown to

Saigon in an American military aircraft, where he was released to Vietnamese authorities.

5. "Did Ambassador Lodge go to Vietnam with any instructions which might have made him sympathetic to a coup attempt?"

Ambassador Lodge did not go to Vietnam with any instructions to show sympathy toward a coup attempt.

6. "What effect will these developments in Vietnam and U.S. involvement in the coup have on our allies in SEATO, in Europe, and most particularly in Central and South America?"

So far, all of our allies in SEATO and in Europe, as well as in Central and South America, have shown a positive response to the assurances that the new regime in South Vietnam will strive to set up a democratic form of government. Some of these countries recognized the new government before the United States did, and almost each day brings official statements of recognition from other countries which recognized the preceding government in Vietnam.

7. "Is there any evidence that the CIA and the DIA might have been working at cross purposes, with one of the agencies favoring a coup and the other opposing?"

No.

8. "Does there not seem indeed to be a need for a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence to look into these matters?"

The Department of State has previously expressed its views on this matter. In our judgment, recent events in Vietnam provide no basis for altering these views.

I hope that this information will be of assistance to you. Please let me know if we can be of further help on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK G. DUTTON,
Assistant Secretary.

Concerning the situation in Vietnam itself, I regret to see that recent developments tend to confirm the fears I expressed in early November after the military coup and brutal assassination of President Diem.

My major concern at that time was that the new military government in Vietnam, by its initial acts of violence, had jeopardized its chances of obtaining the broad popular support so necessary if it is to rule effectively and carry forward the campaign against the Vietcong.

Let me assure those of my colleagues who have expressed to me their own concern over this issue that the Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Committee will continue to study the situation in Vietnam. In that regard, the subcommittee will, from time to time, hold hearings beginning tomorrow with 2 days of executive hearings. It is my hope that the testimony received in these hearings ultimately can be made public.

As in the past, press comments on Vietnam are conflicting. There does seem, however, to be rising criticism of the policies of the new military government. Therefore, I requested permission to include articles from the Milwaukee Journal, the Washington Star, the Washington Post, and the New York Times at this point in the Record and commend them to my colleagues:

[From the Milwaukee Journal, Dec. 6, 1963]

DICTATORSHIP LIVES ON

When the Vietnamese regime of Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown, people danced in the streets of Saigon. The jails were emptied

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and political prisoners who had been held and tortured for months and even years rejoined their families and friends. To most it seemed like the dawn of a new era.

But the jails are fast filling up again. The new regime, backed strongly by a section of the military, has been making numerous and arbitrary arrests. People are being seized without warning and held without charge. Under Diem, most prisoners were allowed visitors twice a week. Under the new regime, visitors are not allowed.

Some arrests were to be expected. Some are usually necessary when a junta ousts a regime—for those who remain loyal to the old regime could be dangerous to the new. But what troubles the Vietnamese people and foreigners is that the new regime doesn't even pretend to follow any rule of law. It just jails people—without formal charge, without chance of obtaining a lawyer, without any opportunity for defense. And most arrests are purely political.

In the meantime little progress is being made by the Government in its attempt to rid the countryside of Communist guerrillas. The Communists have increased their activity and have won several recent engagements. The new Government seems chiefly interested in keeping itself in power. It has taken no steps to liberalize itself or to plan for elections as it had promised. The hopes that were so high after the fall of Diem are all but gone. Tragedy is still the fate of the Vietnamese.

[From the Washington Star, Dec. 8, 1963]

TRONY IN VIETNAM

Last month, when President Diem and Mr. Nhu were brutally slain in South Vietnam's military coup, there was much talk among the starry-eyed about a new birth of freedom and a new birth of democratic order. Well, let us take note of the realities: (1) There is continuing tension in Saigon and surrounding areas. (2) There is continuing political repression. And (3) there is continuing danger of a great internal blowup. Supporting evidence includes the fact that hundreds of individuals are being held as political prisoners under grim conditions. And the grisly rite of self-immolation still goes on.

The so-called Buddhists, of course, are happy. Mr. Diem is dead. Mr. Nhu is dead. And Madame Nhu, whose sharp tongue has sometimes spoken truths that should have been listened to more attentively, is in exile. But the affair is not ended. Trouble and intrigue still plague South Vietnam, and few things could be more foolish than to shrug off that fact. Ironically enough, the day may come when the Diem regime will be remembered as a relatively enlightened one.

[From the Washington Star, Dec. 7, 1963]

NEW VIETNAM MESS RISING

(By Marguerite Higgins)

President Johnson is faced with a new and ugly mess in Vietnam. And it is going to become increasingly to light despite the apparent determination of some American officials in Saigon to brush it under the rug.

The newest situation causing concern is the police terror that the military junta has launched, and that has already reached hundreds of hapless Vietnamese. They have been thrown into jail without notification to their families, without benefit of lawyers, without even being told the charges against them.

With few exceptions, the only apparent reason is the suspicion that the imprisoned Vietnamese did their duty in carrying out, prior to the coup, the orders of the then duly constituted authority, the late President Diem. In a word, they had been loyal.

On a tour of Vietnam in November, this reporter talked to a half dozen persons who had lost relatives to the military junta's

jails. And such was the atmosphere of fear, that in every single case, this reporter was asked not to write about it, until she was out of Vietnam.

ISN'T HELPING MAN

Quite apart from the principles involved, the junta's wave of political repression isn't helping the war against the Vietcong. For the persons loyal to Diem were—like their chief—deeply committed to fighting the war against the Communists.

A case in point is the chief of Quangnai Province in north central Vietnam, Nguyen Van Tat, who has been fired and jailed. But look at Mr. Tat's record. In 18 months as province chief, he turned Quangnai, which for 20 years had been overwhelmingly pro-Communist, into a model and prosperous area in which the peasant population joined the military in beating off Communist attacks.

At the height of the Buddhist crisis last summer, the leaders of the Quangnai pagoda approached Mr. Tat and informed him that the Buddhist leaders at the Xaioi pagoda in Saigon had ordered them to go on a 72-hour hunger strike. The local Buddhists added, that while they had nothing against Mr. Tat, they could not very well disobey an order from their religious higher-ups in Saigon.

AIDED HUNGER STRIKERS

After a hurried conference with Maj. John Kelly, American sector adviser in Quangnai, Mr. Tat told the Buddhists that while he regretted their determination to go on a hunger strike, he would do everything possible to make their experience as painless as possible. With Major Kelly's help, he brought in blankets, fruit juices, and medical attendants. And the hunger strike went off without incident in Quangnai city hall, where Mr. Tat had made arrangements for the comfort of the Buddhists.

In a country starved for good administrators, Mr. Tat's purge scarcely seems in the national interest of Vietnam.

Many of the fringes and purges has been based on hysterical denunciations in the newly "friend" Vietnamese press, or even on plain rumor. This seems to have been largely true in the case of Ngo Dinh Can, the elder brother of President Diem.

Mr. Can was handed over to Vietnamese authorities even though he sought refuge at the American consulate at Hue, and even though English-speaking persons heard the American consul promise Mr. Can that the American Embassy would "assure him his safety."

When a Catholic priest got William Truehart, deputy chief of mission, out of a dinner party to ask why the promise had not been kept, he was told there had "been a misunderstanding." But there has been a curious silence on the part of the Embassy concerning the military junta's promise to assure Mr. Can of "due process of law." At the end of November, Mr. Can had not yet seen charges against him, and the American Embassy had shown no visible sign of trying to pressure the junta into living up to its word.

QUERY U.S. SILENCE

There are many Vietnamese who ask why the Embassy and the State Department, who were so vocal about Mr. Diem, have been so quiet about the newest wave of repressions.

This is a question that President Johnson is entitled to press—even if it is embarrassing to those Americans in Saigon and Washington who feel a certain sense of responsibility for the military junta because it is in power by their encouragement.

Indeed, in leaving Vietnam, this reporter gained the impression that the three persons most anxious for the coup d'état—Ambassador Lodge, Under Secretary of State Harri-man, and Far Eastern Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman—had unleashed forces that are turning out far different than they foresaw.

One thing is clear. The American image in Asia is not going to profit from a kind of double standard that helps get rid of one government in the name of ending police repression and then stays silent as the new government invokes the same tactics.

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 8, 1963]

PERSECUTION OF CATHOLICS VEXES SAIGON

SAIGON, December 7.—Reports of anti-Catholic persecution and Communist agitation among students today were causing serious concern to the new South Vietnamese Government.

The Roman Catholic newspaper Living Religion said that 600 Catholics in northern Quang Nam province were terrorized and six arrested and tortured since the November 1 coup that ousted the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

At the same time, reports from all over the country said authorities were worried about Communist subversion among students.

The Catholic newspaper said Catholics were afraid to go to mass and were taking down altars in their own homes. Catholics are outnumbered five to one by the majority Buddhist population.

It also said that a Catholic leader has been arrested and others have been forced to attend indoctrination courses. At the same time, rumors were spread that Catholic priests kept guns and that Catholics had planned to murder Buddhists before the coup.

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 8, 1963]

DINH ENDS VIET TOUR IN TRIUMPH

HOI AN, SOUTH VIETNAM, December 7.—In this remote coastal town, the man who is fast becoming South Vietnam's most popular figure made a spectacular finish today to his stumping tour of villages and hamlets near the Communist border.

His swashbuckling manner captivated villagers. His words came through forcefully. He answered catcalls with a joke. Students paraded him on their shoulders.

Some saw potential danger in him; others said he is just what South Vietnam needs.

He is Maj. Gen. Ton That Dinh, 37, a leader of the coup that toppled the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem in November.

Dinh gave his final speech of the tour from a balcony at provincial headquarters in Hoi An, 150 miles southeast of the Communist North Vietnamese border.

PARADING ENDS TALK

Finishing with his characteristic flurry of gestures, Dinh stood back as 5,000 students burst into cheers. Then the students charged up the steps, hoisted him to their shoulders and carried him off.

As he passed through the crowd, he called out:

"I am not a politician as some of you newsmen seem to think."

But the fact is that this boyish-looking military officer is emerging as the strongest national figure in Vietnam.

Since the deaths of President Diem and his brother Nhu, the country has been under the control of a revolutionary junta headed by Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh and Maj. Gen. Tran Van Dong.

In the junta, Dinh is a second vice chairman, Minister of Security, and commander of the Vietnamese 3d Army Corps.

He led the army units that stormed Diem's palace during the coup and is credited with engineering the revolt, despite the fact he had served as the military governor of Saigon under Diem and Nhu during the Buddhist religious crisis.

QUESTIONED ABOUT NHU

During his speech at Hoi An, a handful of students heckled him on his relationship with Nhu. One shouted:

"You supported Nhu before the revolution, but then you overthrew him. Why?"

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Dinh beamed and replied: "Changing circumstances require changing actions."

At Quang Tri near the Communist border, Dinh strode through a wildly cheering crowd without guards or security and mounted a platform. Students grabbed him and put a garland of flowers around his neck.

"One of the most fatal mistakes the Diem regime made was that it did not have any contact with the people. We mean to change that," he said.

American military advisers, who watched some of Dinh's speechmaking, were startled, and reactions were mixed.

"What the hell is this?" one said. "This man can whip up a crowd to anything. I think it's dangerous."

But another American adviser said, "It's like the shrewd politicians who used to stomp the American countryside. This is exactly what's needed here, and I'm all for General Dinh."

Rumors have circulated recently that a split had developed between Dinh and Minh and Dong. There is no open evidence of a split, and Dong and Dinh often are seen together at Saigon night spots.

Nevertheless, Dinh's power and prestige have surged upward since the coup, and it is doubtful the junta would do anything at this point to oppose him.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 8, 1963]

SAIGON FACES CRITICAL BATTLES—THERE IS NO CERTAINTY NEW REGIME CAN ROUT COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS

(By Hedrick Smith)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, December 7.—This is time of flux and uncertainty in Vietnam when the only sure thing is the critical state of the war against the Communists in the rich and fertile farmlands of the Mekong River Delta rolling south from Saigon.

There is little disagreement here that the war in the delta is in serious shape—more serious than officials in Washington have let on—and that during the next grueling 6 months the new Government faces an uphill struggle simply to regain initiative.

Nor is there any doubting that the generals who deposed President Ngo Dinh Diem have inherited an incredibly difficult task. Several Americans who work and travel regularly in the delta claim that if there had been no coup virtually the entire area outside of the provincial centers would have slipped into Vietcong hands by spring.

In the months before the coup and in the 5 weeks since, Communist forces have grown more brazen and powerful. They attack more often in broad daylight. Their marauding units are larger, often company or battalion size.

CAPTURED WEAPONS

With the capture of U.S. weapons the Communists have proven more dangerous for American helicopters—the weapons once expected to give anti-Communist forces uncontested advantage over the guerrillas. Now rare is the day when helicopters flying combat missions in the delta do not report their planes have been hit by Communist ground-fire.

The situation in the delta stems largely from the cumulative effect of a year of neglect and bad military tactics and Diem's political interference with the military. At the same time the Vietcong have built up a steady progression of strength and have extended their popular influence with a propaganda campaign which was more than a match for the Government.

This has created a vicious circle of problems for the Government now. "We have the problem of convincing the people that the Government will win this contest," one U.S. Army adviser said. "Until we do we won't have good military intelligence. Until we have good intelligence we won't have good military operations. And if we don't

have them we can't convince people that we will win."

Many Americans hoped the impact of the November coup and the prospect of more responsive government would help break this cycle. Some feel the generals now ruling South Vietnam have so far failed to capitalize adequately on the popular good will generated by their coup.

But even now in Saigon and in provincial cities the new Government is well received. The high crest of enthusiasm has abated but the honeymoon period is not yet over. There is still a widespread sense of relief that the oppressive Diem regime is gone.

The change in the National Government has meant most to the people in areas where austere and often corrupt local officials of the Diem regime have been removed. This has given the coup immediate impact to the peasants. For this reason the new regime has steadily been replacing all province and district chiefs despite the inevitable disruptive impact on the Government machinery of such a move.

MOVES TO FREEDOM

More important, however, is that the widespread sense of oppression under Diem has eased. The new Government has gradually moved toward political and religious freedoms.

The press and former opposition politicians have emerged from hibernation or rigid control to test the freedoms guaranteed by the new junta. Admittedly these have only been the first baby steps toward democracy but, as one Westerner put it, "the people don't want politics they just want to breathe."

About 400 officials and businessmen closely connected with the Ngo family have been arrested since the coup. But most Westerners have been surprised at the new Government's restraint and the absence of a vindictive bloodbath. Of those arrested about half have been released, a few charged and roughly 200 are still under detention.

Although some arrests have undoubtedly been made to settle political accounts and most are illegal in the Anglo-Saxon sense, Saigon is not cringing from a reign of terror nor do the people complain of police state tactics. Arrests have been publicized and the treatment of political prisoners is far more humane than under the Diem regime which had 18 different security apparatuses seizing people at any time of the day or night.

If anything, Saigon's current malaise is uncertainty about the Government's future course. The power of President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was so pervasive that the new power structure is filling the political vacuum slowly.

AT THE TOP

The generals have added to the uncertainty by their own bickering and indecisiveness. Only last week the junta decided to shift three top field commanders and reversed itself within 24 hours. Some administrative agencies seem almost paralyzed awaiting orders "from the top."

But there have been encouraging signs. Americans are convinced that there is a far greater awareness of the difficulties of war than under Diem, greater candor in discussing problems and more willingness to heed American advice.

"The price in blood is now much greater than it would have been a year ago," one American military adviser remarked grimly. "The great unanswerable question is whether the new Government leaders are aware and are willing to accept the price it takes to win the war."

THE LATE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

(Mr. RYAN of New York was granted permission to extend his remarks at this

point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RYAN of New York. Mr. Speaker, on November 25, the day our beloved President John F. Kennedy was buried in Arlington Cemetery, memorial services were held in the synagogues and churches throughout the land. The overwhelming grief of our people was reflected in the words spoken that day.

On November 25, 1963, at Congregation B'nai Jeshurun in New York City, the Honorable Charles H. Silver, president of the congregation, delivered a moving address at memorial services for John F. Kennedy. I include that address at this point in the RECORD.

ADDRESS BY HON. CHARLES H. SILVER

Our land has endured an agonizing nightmare that even the most insane narrator of fiction could not conceive.

Unfortunately, it is no wild dream from which we can awake to comforting reality, nor a disturbing novel whose cover we can close with a sigh of relief.

Dark, indeed, is the glass through which we look back on the events of the past few days.

The President is dead. Even as we mourn the loss of America's first citizen, we lament, as well, the loss of a part of our national self-respect.

All we have left are the bitter dregs of our bereavement—a chance to examine the heartbreak and error of yesterday—the fault and sorrow today. Out of these, perhaps, we can somehow build a path to a brighter tomorrow.

But we must not forget. We must remember these things. We must remember these momentous days of dread and resolve—in the sight of our Creator—to make amends, to seek the truth, and, with sanity, justice, and mercy, to wipe this abomination from the blighted pages of history.

The first news came like a bolt from the sky. This, it truly was—shocking and numbing in its impact on people in their homes and offices—workers in factories and shops—children in their classrooms.

With moist eyes, unable to move from our television sets, we have watched, stunned and confounded by a series of unbelievable scenes, consumed by a sense of horror and disbelief.

As the original fact of the cowardly attack on our President struck home—and then struck again with the dreadful tidings of his death—the whole world came to a sudden shuddering halt. The crowded streets froze into screaming silence.

In every fearful heart there came a piercing grief, a pang of sorrow for Mrs. Kennedy and the children. In every city, freedom held its breath.

The day of infamy that was born in Dallas began to spread its darkness at noon across the tortured face of the earth.

From every farflung land, even from behind the Iron Curtain, where compassion seemed to have fled, there came a sound of sobbing. Humanity could not stem its tears.

The bleeding flesh of our heroic dead became a symbol of mankind's shame that civilization could breed the evil hand and eye that aimed that fatal shot.

Was this the terrible price of too much freedom?

Are the borders of constitutional protection too broad for those who despise our laws and desecrate our liberty?

Has our own lazy loyalty and indifferent Americanism played a part in this incredible pattern of events?

It is not easy to answer.

Our hearts are too heavy with the knowledge that our noble young warrior has been cut down in the prime of his days, in the

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very procession of his triumph, at the very beginning of his most notable achievements. He can no longer lead us in the struggle for justice and decency. And yet, somehow, he leads us still.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy had a way of telling us his plans for the New Frontier that made the soul of America stand taller. There was deep conviction in his voice and intellectual authority in every glowing phrase.

His was a bold, uncompromising call to truth—a call to arms against injustice and oppression that keeps on ringing in our aching hearts.

We hear him yet. We see him as he stood before us, smiling, self-assured, and, oh, so tragically young. He is there—head high, waving to the cheering crowds, rushing forward to shake a friendly hand.

Such a man cannot be eliminated by a madman with a gun—no, nor by the madness that walks abroad in the world. Such a man lives in the hope of every citizen, growing with the growth of the great country he served, alive and indestructible in our memories of those few short years when his own stature grew to match those other great Americans to whose ideals John Kennedy devoted his life.

Time erects his monument and history will build it high. We weep that Israel has lost this cherished friend. We are outraged at the disgrace that befell our land and took away our leader.

But we are proud that our beloved President, in death as in life, stamped the profile of his magnificent courage across the conscience of mankind.

He asked not what his country could do for him. He asked only what he could do for his country—and no man could have done more.

On this untimely day of atonement, as we sit in the synagogue along with all the generations of Israel, we pay homage to our sacred dead.

We honor the image of his remembered glory, his wisdom, wit, and eloquence. Our spirit is warmed again by the fire that lighted his love of America.

In his name, let us resolve to strengthen the sinews of our national integrity, to protect the principles of liberty, justice, and equality for which he gave his life.

That is the greatest tribute we can pay our fallen hero in eternal gratitude for his ultimate sacrifice, while our hearts follow him, along with our fervent prayers, to that further New Frontier he is entering tonight.

Let us rise, beseeching eternal peace and the blessing of Almighty God, as we join in a minute of silent prayer, for the immortal soul of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 35th President of the United States.

In the last paragraph of the last speech he ever wrote, he expressed some of this philosophy for himself, for his country, and for the world:

"We in this country, in this generation, are—by destiny rather than choice—the watchmen on the walls of world freedom. We ask, therefore, that we may be worthy of our power and responsibility—that we may exercise our strength with wisdom and restraint—and that we may achieve for our time and for all time the ancient vision of peace on earth, good will toward men. That must always be our goal—and the righteousness of our cause must always underlie our strength."

THE AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEM: SUBJECT OF INTENSIVE STUDY AND DEBATE

(Mr. LINDSAY (at the request of Mr. MOSHER) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, the American banking system has recently been the subject of intensive study and debate. Such groups as the Commission on Money and Credit, the Advisory Committee on Banking to the Comptroller of the Currency, the President's Committee on Financial Institutions, as well as several committees of Congress, have given serious attention to our financial structure both in its broader aspects and in detail. They have considered whether the dual banking system, with its complex of State and Federal laws and overlapping jurisdictions of State and Federal supervisory agencies, remains an effective mechanism for the allocation of capital and credit. They have addressed themselves to the question whether existing statutory and administrative restrictions upon banking—many of which have their origin in the economic collapse of the thirties—are suitable in the light of present-day conditions. They have examined the organization of the Federal agencies responsible for monetary regulation and the supervision of our banking institutions.

Out of these manifold inquiries have come many proposals for change. Some of the proposals are embodied in bills pending before committees of the Congress, others are not.

I do not intend to speak to the merits of these proposals. I will address myself instead to the circumstances which, in the opinion of many informed observers, have made legislative action upon the more far-reaching proposals—and even upon the more modest suggestions—unlikely, if not impossible at this time. These circumstances arise in the main out of sharp conflicts in policy among the various Federal banking supervisory agencies—conflicts further aggravated by the absence of procedures for consultation and coordination among these agencies. The absence of broad agreement within the banking industry upon the need for many of the proposals, or the form in which particular proposals should be cast, is a further factor inhibiting legislative action.

The proceedings of the American Bankers Association annual convention held in Washington during the week of October 7 revealed in harsh outline the conflicts in policy and approach on the part of the several Federal banking agencies exercising jurisdiction over major portions of the banking industry.

The Congress is not unfamiliar with inconsistent policies on the part of agencies of the same Federal Government, and conflicting aspirations on the part of segments of the same industry. Indeed, informed legislative action is built in large part upon judgments shaped by the clash of competing interests and contradictory views both within and outside the Government. However, Congress has a right to expect that agencies of the executive branch will ultimately compromise their differences so that the legislative branch may proceed with some assurance that its action is acceptable to those upon whom it relies for expert advice. There is no evidence at this time that such a consensus is even a remote possibility. On the contrary,

the relationships among Federal agencies exercising coordinate or related jurisdiction over banking have deteriorated steadily. Inevitably, such deterioration has been accompanied by an unfortunate polarization of their policies on matters of vital importance to the banking community.

Intervention by the President, in my judgment, is long overdue. While, concededly, the President lacks direct control over some aspects of Federal monetary and banking regulation, the very substantial measure of control which he does have, together with the prestige of his office, afford a proper basis for his immediate action. The President, in my opinion, should designate a high ranking Federal official—perhaps an Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary of the Treasury—as the coordinator of relationships among all the Federal agencies concerned with bank regulation. These Federal agencies include the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, with jurisdiction over national banks; the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, with jurisdiction over State-chartered member banks; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, with jurisdiction over State-chartered insured nonmember banks; and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, with jurisdiction over federally chartered savings and loan associations and member State-chartered savings and loan associations. Also involved in banking regulation to a growing degree is the Department of Justice, which has advisory responsibilities to some of the agencies mentioned heretofore, as well as direct responsibility for the enforcement of the antitrust laws as they relate to banks. Finally, there is the Securities and Exchange Commission, which has recently asserted jurisdiction over certain of the fiduciary functions of banking institutions.

It should be the responsibility of the President's designee, in concert with the agencies concerned, to work out a detailed procedure for their continuing consultation, and for coordination of their major policies. That official should be responsible for seeing to it that the procedure so formulated is adhered to. It may well be that such action, if taken promptly and vigorously, will obviate in the long run any need for a drastic legislative overhaul of the structure of Federal banking supervision. In any event, intervention by the President would serve as a useful, indeed a necessary, interim measure to ameliorate existing discord, and to prevent further impairment in significant intragovernmental relationships. Most importantly, it would serve to end the present uncertainty in the banking industry and elsewhere as to whether the administration has a banking policy, and if so, what that policy really is.

OUTLAW THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)